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SYMPOSIUM
Anthropology and Human Rights
Administrations: Expert Observation and
Representation After the Fact
Iris Jean-Klein
Edinburgh University
Annelise Riles
Cornell University

Introducing Discipline: Anthropology and Human Rights
Administrations
Anthropologists engage human rights administrationswith an implicit promise
that our disciplinehas something unique to offer The articles in this special issue
turn questions about relevance and care so often heard in the context of debates
about human rights outside in. They focus not on how anthropologycan contribute
to human rights activities, but on what anthropologicalencounters with human
rights contribute to the development of our discipline. They ask, how exactly do
we render the subject relevant to anthropology?Reflecting on some ways anthropologists in thisfield have dispensed carefor their subjects, the authors highlight
two modalities of human rights anthropology,co-construction and denunciation.,
Two key problems with these modalities are identified-theirduplicative and iterative qualities. With reference to the contributionsto this special issue, the authors
make a case for a more ethnographicallyengaged anthropologyof human rights.
They emphasize disciplineddescription and disciplined engagement with the politics of thefield as an ethicalpositionfor anthropology and as a means of reclaiming
disciplinaryrelevance.

The subject of human rights has without a doubt become one of the fastest growing
arenas of anthropological work. Judging from the number of doctoral dissertations, journal articles, edited volumes, books, and conferences on this subject, it is
clear that anthropologists view human rights as an area in which our discipline
has the potential to become particularly relevant to, and hence active in, the
contemporary world.
After anthropology's own methodological and epistemological "crises" of the last
several decades, perhaps there is something reassuring about turning from our
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own emergencies to those of others. Anthropologists engage human rights
administrations with an implicit promise that our discipline has something unique
to offer-special insights and methods. But behind this promise is also a hope
that the challenging engagement with human rights may replenish those methods,
refresh those insights, bring to the foreground new questions. This raises a crucial
question: When and how- does this disciplinary replenishment happen for anthropologists? Given how active the discipline has now become around the problem
and subject of human rights, we think that human rights is a good place to assess
how anthropology refreshes itself through engagement with new subjects. The
question for us then becomes, how exactly do we render the subject relevant to
anthropology? That is, how has human rights challenged anthropology? What
theoretical, methodological, or ethical work has the subject performed for the
discipline, and what should new subjects be doing (for us)?
The articles in this special issue seek to turn questions about relevance and care
so often heard in the context of debates about human rights-about anthropologists' duty to care for their subjects, about their duty to make their knowledge and
others' knowledge relevant to human rights administrations--outside in. They
focus not on how anthropology can contribute to human rights activities, but on
what anthropological encounters with human rights contribute to the development
of our discipline. If human rights holds out the promise of rendering anthropology
newly relevant, we would like this promise to encompass a concern with finding
and bringing home new contexts, conceptual usages, and relational scenarios that
have the potential to surprise, shock, or reassure us, and in this way to enable the
continued growth of our academic discipline.
Sometimes it seems that anthropologists fear that to care about our discipline itself,
in the course of engagement with situations of open and violent conflict or extreme
injustice, constitutes a form of perversion-a kind of lapse of professional ethics.
Moreover, our call for attention to discipline in ethnographic practice as a form of
care for "our discipline" comes in the wake of the discipline's own antidisciplinarian
turn: anthropologists now understand the rise of their academic discipline as an artifact of a particular modernist moment in the social sciences and accompanying set
of divisions of labor in the knowledge economy. Since the 1990s, the trend in anthropology has been rather to celebrate antidiscipline: In a sense loosely derivative
of Foucauldian understandings, discipline now conjures up a conservative form of
analytical domination that stamps out difference and creativity and that captures all
that cultural anthropologists find troubling about more positivistic modes of social
science. Creativity, in this understanding, is more easily seen in loose, open-ended,
emergent forms of knowledge that combine or traverse existing disciplinary
practices. This celebration of "inter," "post," and "trans" as always preferable to,
ahead of, what they relate and traverse feeds into a specific set of concerns with
methodological discipline within anthropology: Anthropologists' own celebration
of interdisciplinarity and postdisciplinarity participates actively in the enthusiasm
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within the university and the knowledge economy more broadly for synergies,
combinations, and networks across "old" disciplinary boundaries.
Given all this talk of antidiscipline, a focus on disciplined practice may seem
oddly out of step with contemporary trends. Nevertheless, we argue in this introduction that self-disciplined ethnographic engagement is a form of professional
commitment to humanitarian ethics (cf. Englund 2000; Pels 2002). Ethnography,
and the commitments it demands, is in fact the only form of engagement that our
profession is uniquely qualified to administer. It is what sets anthropologists apart
from other human fights actors. Far from analytical conservatism or the negation
of difference, a commitment to discipline in fact requires taking real risks in
ethnographic engagement and analytical care and following the claims and discoveries that result from such risks wherever they may lead. Such an engagement,
we argue, is also necessarily a form of care for the discipline itself, albeit of a
kind that postdates modernist notions of disciplinarily produced truth.
The denomination "human rights" glosses a range of diverse, shifting, and
contradictory meanings and practices in the world. As others have pointed out, it is
best understood as a "discursive formation" (Dembour 1996), that is, as an entity
whose coherence can only be understood as an effect. In anthropological debate
in particular, the concept now indexes many longer-standing interests previously
referred to by terms such as political conflict and violence, nationalism, formal
organization, or statecraft. Why the new term in anthropological debate?
Disciplines surely have a tendency to be "loyal to the changing preoccupations of
their times" (Englund 2000:61). Anthropology is hardly immune from "a kind of
'atmospheric hegemony' in which certain ideas manage insidiously to dominate
the scholarly imagination" (Cunningham 1999).
One way in which anthropology's entanglement with its disciplinary exterior
displays itself is that the discipline borrows concepts from worldly occupations it
might otherwise treat as subjects. Some would say this is anthropology's strength
(Strathern 1987, 1992a). We want to add that the degree of self-consciousness and
discipline with which the borrowing is done makes all the difference. From this
perspective, the principal challenge of human rights for anthropology consists not
so much in finding ways to become more active in the world of human rights
administrations as in knowing anthropology's own disciplinary difference and
uniqueness from other enterprises, both academic and political.
The ethnographic examples of human rights administrations presented in this
special issue show human fights, both out in the world and inside our discipline,
to be sometimes a state of emergency, of extreme up-to-the-minuteness (for
example, Rosga). Open political conflicts and ongoing violations are monitored
and simultaneously contested by human rights actors; situations of "still open
wounds" during the aftermaths of conflicts concentrate efforts on rebuilding,
rehabilitating, and healing. At other times, human rights administrators labor on
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in a mundane, seemingly interminable chain of technocratic practices
(Uchiyamada, Merry). Here, human rights actors (and anthropologists) perceive
the potential for harm to be latent, currently "hidden." In practical terms, academics
and human rights administrators must work to identify and elicit forms of
violence that they perceive to be embedded in "everyday" bureaucratic, technocratic,
legal, market, or kinship practices (see Das 1990; Ferm6 2001; Hastrup 2001a,
2003; Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2002; Wilson 2001, 2003b; among others).
Sometimes yet again the subjects move back and forth between these two states
(McLagan).
These two sides to the practice of human rights have in turn generally elicited
different registers of anthropological engagement. One register focuses on diverse
expressions of violence, victimization, and victimhood; the other focuses on
bureaucracies and administrations that are constitutive of states (their governments, armies, legal systems), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and, most
recently, of state-sponsored and extralegal Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
(TRCs) set up in postconflict periods. In the first register, anthropologists tend to
adopt a posture that we will call "co-construction" (see Jean-Klein 2001; after
Swedenburgh 1992); in the second register, the discipline performs a posture of
deconstruction (Handler 1985) or denunciation. In the modality of co-construction,
anthropologists set out to express both moral and analytical empathy with subaltern subjects in the field of study. Analytical engagement becomes the medium
through which moral and social or political support is administered.
Denunciation, in contrast, entails condemning the proliferation of technocratic
regimes and the injustices inherent in organized and official relief efforts. In practice, since every field of human rights administration involves both danger and
mundanity, anthropological writing effectuates a double orientation: working on
one hand with or on behalf of some subjects (usually the victims, or "the people,"
or the "good" NGOs), but on the other hand turning our backs on, if not actively
denouncing, other categories of actors in the field (states, "corrupt" or "useless"
NGOs, truth and reconciliation commissions). Our aim in this special issue is to
treat these two modalities of expressing care (co-construction and denunciation),
and the discrete situations in which anthropologists administer their care, as
mutually illuminating sides. We want to see what productive tensions they may
create for one another.
The first part of our introduction consists of a reflection on some ways anthropologists working in this field have sought to dispense care for their subjects. Our intention is not to produce a complete overview of the field. Rather, we aim merely to
highlight the two modalities of human rights anthropology alluded to above, coconstruction and denunciation, from the perspective of the historical chronology of
the discipline's engagement with modern situations of collective violence, and via
this route, with human rights. We identify two key problems with these modalitieswhat we term their duplicative and iterative qualities. In the second part of the introduction, we suggest how the contributions to this special issue point toward a more
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ethnographically engaged anthropology of human rights. In particular, we emphasize
disciplined description and disciplined engagement with the politics of the field as
an ethical position for anthropology, as a means of reclaiming disciplinary relevance,
and perhaps most importantly, as a means of acknowledging and giving voice to others'
dignity by enacting our own.
Current Practices in the Anthropology of Human Rights: Instrumentalizing
the Discipline
Co-Constructionas "Giving Voice"
Although anthropologists had long worked in situations of armed conflict (such
as colonial occupation and anticolonial resistance), in the 1980s anthropologists
began treating situations of armed conflict as ethnographic settings to be foregrounded in their own right, rather than ignored.' This foregrounding of armed
conflict opened up a new area of anthropological research centered on the experiential dimensions of political conflict and terror, and specifically, on facilitating
victims' narration of their subjective experiences of violence. In the context of
debates in the same period about authorial voice in the ethnographic account, the
"voice" of the anthropologists, and its relation to the voices of those whose
predicaments they set out to represent, became of central importance. For some
anthropologists, and for many outside of anthropology, giving voice curiously
became a kind of postmodem solution to the critiques of positivism on the one
hand, and to the vilification of theory on the other (as in the conceit that one could
get away from representational authority and epistemological debates and simply
"listen to people's voices"). Giving voice to anthropology's subjects during this
period often became synonymous with describing individuals' subjective experience. For many anthropologists working in the specific arena of human rights,
narratives of experience were not just a gap in anthropologists' own knowledge;
they also represented a black hole in victims' own existential locatedness. The
collection of "narratives" thus acquired connotations of humanistic action.
Narration became its own form of relief.
The urgency, 6lan, and confidence with which anthropologists have performed the
work of "listening and witnessing" rests on an unusually stable consensus among
social scientific researchers, a conviction that the experiential dimensions in situations of political violence are characterized by "senses of chaos and ultimate powerlessness" (Ifving and Macek 2000:4; cf. Hastrup 2003; Nordstrom and Robben
1995; Daniel 1994, 1996). The assumption is that violence fundamentally disrupts
social and cosmological orders, that it epistemologically dislocates the victims from
sociality, and that it equally dislocates anthropology, whose meaning-centered
approaches to the subject or understandings of the anthropological project become
likewise misplaced or inappropriate. As Lifving and Macek sum up this perspective:
"The meaning of violence" is itself a contradiction in terms; the
experience of war implies a loss of the conceptual and epistemological
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framework that previously provided means to interpret the events of
life and the death of others. [2000:5]
It is puzzling, given the prevalence of arguments about the way language fails in
the face of pain, that there are virtually no ethnographic investigations of local
ideologies of the efficacy, or limitations, of "language" in relation to traumatic
experience of the kind linguistic anthropologists have conducted concerning the
efficacy of language in other contexts (e.g., Keane 1997). Likewise, given the
importance the discipline attaches to description, and to "local specificity"
(Cowan et al. 2001), there is a surprising absence in such accounts of the kind of
description anthropologists would expect in other ethnographic contexts.
Anthropologists typically engage in far less long-term sustained ethnographic
observation in this field than in other anthropological fields (for exceptions,
see Englund 2000; Finnstrbm 2000; Good 2004). Although we do not doubt the
practical problems associated with fieldwork in this arena (see Hoffman 2003;
Keppley-Mahmood 2002, 2003; Lofving and Macek 2000), it remains ironic that
the very violence and danger anthropologists write about often becomes the
2
reason for not doing ethnography of that violence itself.
The view that language fails tends to be supported rather with references to
Western language philosophy, and specifically to phenomenological and feminist
theorizing on the relationship between language and pain (e.g., Scheper-Hughes
1992; Daniel 1994, 1996; Zur 1996, 1998; Green 1998; Jackson 2002; Wilson
2003a; Hastrup 2003). In the main, anthropologists follow a line of argument
epitomized by the work of Elaine Scarry (Scarry 1985) which holds that violence
and the pain it inflicts is beyond language (see also Daniel 1994). Thus, anthropologists have agonized over where and how to find the necessary narrative
resources and genres to express or narrate pain (Cohen 2001; Macek 2000:38-39;
Taussig 1992:10). As one commentator has noted:
The methodological problem lies in the difficulty of capturing the voice
of pain, because it is not observable-it cannot be quantified because it
has no cultural form, and yet it exists in all forms. Anthropologists dealing with similar problems have noted this difficulty. (Macek 2000:29)
But despite the moral anguish surrounding practices of representing pain, the
assumption that language capacities (speech and narrative capabilities) cannot easily
grasp the experience of pain and accompanying "losses" (social meaning, human
recognition) in turn creates a therapeutic role and moral space for anthropology,
a way of contributing to the social and individual healing process. Anthropological
tools-the ethnographic interview and text-are often reimagined as invaluable
resources through which victimized populations can articulate their suffering, put
it into spoken and narrative format.
In this way, anthropology claims a role in assisting victims to reenter language,
sociality, and humanity. Anthropologists now position themselves as professional
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listeners and even as proto-therapists (most explicitly in Zur 1996, 1998; but
see also Bomeman 1997, 2002a; Daniel 1994; Das 1990, 1996, 2000, 2003a;
Green 1998; Macek 2000; Wilson 2003a). In an introduction to a special volume
of Anthropological Theory on the theme "Political Violence and Language," for
example, Wilson writes:
In all these articles, we get a clear sense of the distinctiveness of
anthropological theorizations of political violence and language, a
distinctiveness which focuses on everyday life and the remaking of
a social world through language.They engage with narratives of suffering on their own terms in order to bear witness, and not to reduce
informants' narratives to wider political and social imperatives and
meta-narrativespursued by official political and legal actors. [Wilson
2003a:269, emphases added]
But what exactly constitutes "listening" remains curiously undefined. We
wonder, for example, whether this dominant modality of listening could recognize,
and seriously engage with, informants who would mark "silence" as a socially
productive posture and hence who would refuse the anthropologist's invitation to
speak (see Coxshall, this volume; see also Jean-Klein 2000). Likewise, we wonder
whether this modality of listening as a means of recognizing victims as social
beings would be able to encompass a recognition that conflict, and human violence,
is its own form of sociality.
We are concerned, in other words, that this work unintentionally naturalizes a
certain Western neoliberal model of individualism and accompanying understanding of sociality and politics (Nelson 1999; Mahmood 2001; cf. Englund 2000).
Understanding is located in the tortured or abused individual body; it can only be
known by the tortured person. As with early feminist anthropology, a field equally
invested in the concept of "experience," these anthropological analyses have the
effect of "ontologizing" theory and knowledge in the form of the individualized
body (Strathern 1988:57). 3 When, for example, Rapport (1997, 1998) advocates
simply "being with" individuals and hearing their stories as a sufficient and selfevident form of dispensing the humanistic ethics that distinguishes our discipline,
he demonstrates a commitment to a particular conception of the person. Or again,
although anthropology instrumentalizes itself to liberal human rights causes it can
identify with, it too often refuses to identify with the possibility that individual
subjects at the heart of liberal human rights regimes might (from out perspective)
"reduce" themselves to focal points in a bureaucratic human rights network (Riles
2000). Instead, we want to remain open to the possibility that other forms of
agency than our own might be at play, and that anthropologists can learn ways of
responding to violence and expressing humanism from these subjects.
By the 1990s, however, the project of "giving voice" encountered an interesting
snag: the human rights community itself seemed to have listened to anthropologists'
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voice! The task of "drawing out" dispersed narratives of violence from subjects
presumed to be incapable of expressing their experiences championed in the
anthropological literature and in the psychotherapeutic disciplines (for recent
iterations of this premise, see Hastrup 2001a, 2003) was taken up by other human
rights actors and projects. The claim that listening and voicing was the first step
toward healing became the premise for new genres of human rights institutions.
As Wendy Coxshall's contribution to this volume shows, institutions like the
Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission now lay claim to the process of
breaking victims' silence and providing authoritative translations of their
experience (see also Wilson 2001, on the South Africa Truth and Reconciliation
Commission). The Peruvian TRC includes anthropologists, and its work explicitly involves "ethnography" (Coxshall 2005). In her work on Palestinian political
committees during the first intifada, likewise, Iris Jean-Klein (2002) shows how
the anthropologist's work finds itself preempted by other practical forms of caring, including other foreign observers-cum-witnesses and Palestinian activists'
activities, which include social scientific data collection and analysis. We are
therefore now at a moment when our professional claims to ethnographic expertise, as expert listeners, find themselves challenged by human rights institutions'
own forms of expertise.
Denunciation
Alongside their work of collecting the subjective narratives of suffering, anthropologists often seek to expose the regimes from which violence emanates. Examples
of this genre are abundant in conflict situations and are not limited to anthropology.
For example, it is particularly common in academic engagements with the violence
of the Israeli state against the Palestinian population (but see Hajjar 2005 for an example of work that explicitly refuses this denunciation project).
In some cases, attention focuses on perpetrators, or processes of perpetration
of violence. Here, critique speaks in the external register of humanitarian outrage.
In the second scenario, critique directs itself against human rights machineries
and speaks in the internal register of expertise and advice. In both cases, however,
anthropologists "act as if" (Wedeen 2003) the regimes of power they confront and
expose were interested, and vulnerable to critique, on the same level as an
academic discipline (e.g., Abu-Lughod 2002; Bowman 2001; Hirschkind and
Mahmood 2002; Mamdani 2002; Wax 2002).
In this literature, formal rehabilitation initiatives orchestrated by states are viewed
with some suspicion (Samson 2001; Warren 1993; Wilson 2001, 2003b).4 As soon
as emerging responses to violence become formalized and institutionalized, it
seems, they become possible targets of anthropological critique.5 Sometimes this
is founded on charges of a lack of sensitivity to the ontology of victimhood on the
part of states, civil organizations, and their retributive technologies. For example,
critiques of TRCs focus on the assumptions implicit in bureaucratic practice that

HeinOnline -- 28 PoLAR 180 2005

November 2005

Page 181

painful experiences must be narrated, and on the ways narratives are reductively
treated in legal discourse and evidentiary regimes. At other times, the critiques
rest on attributions of more cynical motivations (e.g., Warren 1993).
Critiques of human rights administrations represent a particularly interesting
direction in the anthropological literature on human rights because, since the
discipline's disavowal of its own earlier relativist critiques of human rights
doctrine, there has been little anthropological effort to engage in a debate with
human rights actors about human rights as a system of values as such. Although
genealogies of human rights as discursive formations are common (for example,
Dembour 1996; Cowan et al. 2001), such genealogical accounts are generally
undertaken not in a spirit of deconstruction, but in a spirit of attentiveness to the
ambiguity, arbitrariness, hybridity, and contestation of "local" or prior values to
the human rights regime.
Expert Participation:Fusing Co-Construction and Denunciation
A third modality of anthropological participation in human rights bureaucracies
involves bureaucratic action-cum-activism. Many anthropologists have noted
that, for better or worse, the subject of human rights demands engagement with
lawyers, legal scholars, political philosophers, and politicians-with disciplines
and actors anthropologists recognize as "powerful." In this modality of "acting
up" (if not exactly "studying up"), the anthropologist self-consciously emulates
the procedural practices of human rights organizations, bureaucracies, and
administrations and tempers his or her militancy in favor of a more objective,
bureaucratic tone. This can entail setting up networks, producing human rights
documents, serving as an expert witness to legal and public tribunals (see, for
example, Good 2004), working as an advisor to human rights bureaucracies (see
Borneman 1997, 2002b; Ross 2003; Wilson 2001, 2003b; Hastrup 2003), and
more. In this way, anthropologists perform what they so often describe: an age of
decentralized politics where anyone-including the anthropologist-"can adopt
the logic of protest and participate" (McLagan, this issue).
Entering the service of existing bureaucracies, then, is a way in which the
anthropologist turns herself, and her knowledge, into an instrument for human
rights practice and its dissemination. Anthropologists may advise on ethical listening practices (see Borneman 1997, 2002; Das 2000, 2003; Hastrup 2003; Wilson
2003:380); they may put themselves forward as particularly knowledgeable about
"cultural issues" and even seek to correct other human rights actors' outdated
understandings of the culture concept in light of updated understandings in
the discipline (e.g., Dembour 1996; Wilson 1997a, 1997b; Cowan et al. 2001a;
Abu-Lughod 2002; Eriksen 2001; Hastrup 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Montgomery
2001). In sum, anthropologists act as epistemological technicians able to provide
a "principled and theoretically informed empirical approach" to human rights
projects (see Cowan et al. 2001).
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But while anthropologists willingly lend themselves as instruments to other
human rights bureaucracies, and participate fully in these at particular moments,
their knowledge nevertheless often remains something of a Trojan horse. In some
cases, the anthropologists' integration within human rights bureaucracies is from
the start "halfhearted," undertaken with a dose of hermeneutic skepticism, just to
get a glimpse of how things work on the inside and with a mind to offering critique as much as advice. In other cases, although anthropologists enter with a
view to participate fully, there come moments and contexts in which they turn
against the bureaucracy. Published work that comes back to the discipline, for example, usually takes the form of critically framed ethnographic accounts (see for
example Mosse 2005; Ross 2003; Wilson 2001). Thus, the role of the expert fuses
the modalities of co-construction and denunciation. This contradiction is surprisingly comfortably sustained, in the anthropologist's daily life, as an ethical and
professional stance.
In presenting disciplinary expertise in this way, anthropologists necessarily
translate their disciplinary tools to others. But there is a problem: In the translation, these tools become redescribed as if they were detachable from the unique
purpose for which they were designed, that is to make knowledge of a particular
kind-ethnographic knowledge. Although this arguably carves out a sphere for
anthropological expertise, it does so at a price: a curious devaluation of the broad
range of analytical practices and forms of human engagement that constitute
anthropology's own project. The consequence is that the anthropologist's task,
in this context, is too often merely to provide the "facts"-notably facts about
"culture" or about the right way to understand and work with the culture concept
for use by lawyers, bureaucrats, and activists in their own analyses and projects.
The Turn to Description: "Context" and "Subjective Experience" Once More
Most recently, perhaps because of anthropologists' newfound access to human
rights actors and institutions in their capacities as experts, the discipline has
discovered human rights cultures as ethnographic subjects in their own right.
Wilson for example proposes to focus on tracing ethnographically the "social
life" and "situational operation" of rights (Wilson 1997a:3; cf. Dembour 1996;
Cowan et al. 2001; Hastrup 2001, 2003). Here, the anthropology of human rights
aims to redescribe human rights practices in a way that provides the missing context for those practices (not detailed in human ights actors' own accounts such as
funding proposals, position papers, and so on). This contextualization entails two
essential operations: mapping how actors engage with the incoming form of
human rights discourses and practices as they interpret, translate, appropriate for
themselves, resist, or reject such discourses and practices; and supplementing
objective human rights reportage with accounts of the subjective experiences and
emotional dimensions of ordinary persons' narratives of human rights procedures
(Wilson 1997a:21).
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In the case of the human rights bureaucracies, the ethnographic problem takes a
slightly different form: anthropologists who encounter such bureaucracies often
feel that there is "nothing to observe" there-nothing "interesting" or unusual,
just mundane practices that too closely resemble their own (Riles 2000). And, in
a parallel way to the study of violence, the very assumption of the global nature
of these human rights practices 6 becomes an excuse for the anthropologist
to travel globally him or herself, and hence to conduct interviews in short-term
visits and with selected individuals.
One question posed by several of the articles in this special issue is, does
description always produce the same kind of artifact-context? And does context
always look the same? Rosga in her article for example demonstrates that her
informants' conception of context, including of the context they would like her to
produce, as team social scientist, is very much at odds with her own representative practices. Likewise, Meg McLagan describes a unique type of artifact, the
human rights issue, as it is produced by and circulated within global circuits of
activism. This production anticipates that, like anthropological concepts and
tools, the artifact must find, or generate its own specific kinds of contexts. What
these examples suggest is that adding in context is not the equivalent of ethnographic description, just as narratives of subjective experiences of violence are
not the equivalent of the ethnography of violence.
Two Problems with the Self-InstrumentalizationofAnthropology vis-ii-vis Human
Rights Administrations: Duplicationand Iteration
In considering how, since the 1980s, anthropology has met its self-described commitment to "speaking truth to power" (see Conkiin 2003; cf. Keppley-Mahmood
2002, 2003; Starn 1991), as a form of.humanitarian ethics (Pels 2002), we have
argued that anthropology's engagement with human rights takes a dual or binary
form. On the one hand, anthropologists dedicate themselves to giving voice to
victims and to providing expert assistance to bureaucratic and activist projects.
On the other hand, this work is supplemented with the deconstruction or critique
of power by crafting structural and historical/genealogical accounts of regimes of
power and violence.
We are sympathetic to these projects. However, we think that they reach their
limit precisely in the way they resemble their subject, universalizing human rights
administrations. To begin with, the articles in this issue show that the human
rights world anthropologists would describe and act upon is already infused with
proto-anthropological gestures and proto-anthropologists. Although anthropologists
often claim observation and representation as their domains of expertise, for example, much human rights work consists also of fact-finding, reporting, analysis, and
poetic evocation-even "contextualization" (see Rosga, McLagan, and Merry).
Likewise, where anthropologists aspire to the role of expert critic of human rights
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administrations, communities of "critical legal scholars" now invoke the same
bodies of critical theory to produce highly nuanced, sophisticated analyses of
the type anthropologists ideally hope to produce (Riles in press).
So do Palestinian activists of mass- and later civil society organizations (see
Jean-Klein 2002, and N.d.a; for illustrations, see Hiltermann 1991). Increasingly,
the ethnographer must confront the fact that the ethnographic, documentary,
expressive, therapeutic, analytical, and critical tasks are duplicated in the field.
Human rights bodies become, active in similar ways as our discipline-by demonstrating their commitment to a humanitarian ethics and a neoliberal ideology; by
conducting research (Mosse 2005); by craving "ethnographic" data, or at least
narratives and stories (Good 2004; Hastrup 2003; Ross 2003); and even by
performing "critical views" of themselves (see Elyachar 2002, 2003; Riles
in press). Where human rights is concerned, then, anthropology is from the outset entangled with its subject (cf. Englund 2000:61; Cunningham 1999; Gledhill
2000), whether the specific points of onset are circuits of grassroots activism,
bureaucracies of legal and extralegal retributive justice, NGOs, or relief administration. Cowan et al. (2001) could not be more right when they observe that
anthropology is "ambiguously" positioned.
What is striking about the ethnography in the articles in this special issue, moreover,
is that in them we encounter others (activists, bureaucrats, victims, perpetrators)
actually anticipating the anthropologist's descriptive, analytical, and critical practices---creating a gap for the anthropologist to fill, inviting the anthropologist to
slot him or herself into their practices (cf. Riles 2000). Activists invite anthropologists and other observers to "study" them (for example, in the scenario presented
in Jean-Klein 2002). Merry describes how NGO workers invited her to serve on
their board of directors in order to claim her assistance in securing funding. They
know where to place her. Is it a kind of ironic play, on our informants' part, on the
anthropologist's conceit that the anthropologist simply does what others in the
field ask of him or her and learns from them? It is also a kind of inside-out version of the old indigenously produced "invented traditions" (Miyazaki 2000). In
any case, here we have a prefabricated space, or slot for the anthropologist's
analyses to fill.
Often duplication, or at least the approximation of activist genres of knowledge, is
in fact the explicit goal of the anthropology of human rights. But perhaps then it is
no wonder that the ways anthropologists fill the spaces the human rights regime
creates for them is in turn quite formulaic. In our view, the dual strategy of coconstruction anddenunciation that pervades the anthropology of human rights also
defines the limits of anthropology's own possibilities. Stuck with this simple set of
alternatives, anthropology has too often become automatic and unimaginative in
its engagement with human rights. It seems that the distance between anthropology
and its subjects-the bureaucracies-depends on anthropologists locking themselves
into a fixed theoretical perspective, a worn set of analytical commitments, such as
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a view of language, which in another context they would treat as far more open to
contestation and debate (e.g., Silverstein 1976).
For instance, the professed contingency of anthropological denunciations is often
in practice far more predictable than it claims. The work of crafting structural and
genealogical accounts of violence as "process" or "discursive formation" is often
a formulaic genre of description. The modalities are limited and the insights are
7
interchangeable, even repetitive.
The problem, then, is that the anthropology of human rights becomes iterative.
That is, it asserts, makes real by stating-for example, that there exists a human
rights violation; that life in conflict is not guided by laws of history and society;
that violence creates epistemological chaos; that the victim inhabits a "nervous
system"; that the state appropriates victims' testimonies. Research devoted to critiquing human rights institutions names ever more diverse iterations of violence:
The economic violence of development policy (Elyachar 2002, 2003), the violence of bureaucratic politics (see Uchiyamada, this issue), the violence of official definitions of kinship (Borneman 2002b, Das 1996, 2000; Ferm6 2001;
Shalhoub-Koverikan 2002), and everyday forms of familial "care" (Das 1996,
2000, 2003) become metaphorically related to the violence of torture and armed
conflict, and hence are subject to "critical analysis" rather than empathetic narration. Violence becomes "the net" (Wagner 2001:3-17) from which anthropologists cannot seem to escape in their observation and thinking.
Too often, we think, the anthropology of human rights forgoes ethnographic
engagement and description for prefigured analyses and slogan-making.
Anthropologists' appeal to certain reified answers to the challenges posed by
bureaucracy-to the idea that specificity is needed to produce "context" and
hence "difference," that specificity produces difference automatically, and to the
need to make room for "personal experience"-often generates the very rhetorical smoke screen that allows the discourse of human rights to coagulate. As a result, anthropology becomes instrumentalized by other human rights actors but also
marginalized in ways that anthropologists surely do not intend, as, for example,
when asylum tribunals invite anthropologists in to give expert opinions only to
demand forms of reporting and levels of argumentation that are close to absurdity from an academic anthropological point of view. Given that the discipline
routinely claims that its "relevance" lies in its faculties of description, perhaps
one route to relevance would be for anthropologists to harness their own considerable
faculties of description, to do what we do best.
An Alternative: Discipline in Description
One way of summarizing all of this is to say that anthropologists too often
abandon their own commitment to ethnographic engagement in order to make
themselves relevant to human rights movements and administrations. What
concerns us is the implicit understanding of "relevance" at work here. Relevance,
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in this conception, is simply a fact. One is or is not relevant. But what ethnographers know from the experience of making themselves relevant to their subjects
is that relevance is an effect that must be elicited through disciplined practice. In
fieldwork, it takes discipline to become relevant. Often, on arrival in the field, for
example, anthropologists discover that certain acts are expected. They find certain
alliances, certain relationships immediately forced upon them. It takes discipline
and care to distance oneself in some settings and forgo certain opportunities to get
involved, or to persist at working to develop relations in others, that is, to stop and
hold still when people ask the ethnographer to join, construct, or critique.
Ultimately it is often this discipline that garners respect-and that also defines
one's social relevance. Indeed, this disciplined practice is one defining characteristic
of ethnography, and of its relevance.
This is important because one of the insights of the ethnographies in this issue
is that one can only counter one form of discipline with another. One
anthropological response to the detrimental effects of bureaucratic and legal forms
of discipline that pervade human rights practices has been to seek to counter
it with the opposite-unaccountable and undisciplined creativity. Uchiyamada's
article for this issue, which details the author's predicament as a bureaucrat caught
in a Japanese development bureaucracy who seeks, without success, an escape
route from its discipline, is a case in point. Uchiyamada begins his contribution
to this special issue from the standpoint of his own loathing of disciplinary form.
He wishes to counter that discipline with other forms drawn from art, architecture,
and fiction, forms he takes to be the exact opposite of such discipline. But ironically,
in that process he surrenders his own discipline. One senses the frustration in
Uchiyamada's article, as he finds that the materials he gathers together from
diverse sources, that he would want to hurl at this machinery of discipline by way
of unsettling it, are anticipated by it and readily accommodated. The Japanese
state and its bureaucracy are not of an order that is unsettled by messiness and
critique. In fact, this messiness serves as more fodder for further disciplinary
projects; it gives the bureaucrat something to discipline (Riles 2004)! The same
observation can be made with respect to the incorporation of "polyphonic" voice
into the narrative practices of truth commissions, the UN bureaucrat's appropriation
of ethnography, and even the lawyer's embrace of self-critique as a modality of
human rights law practice (Riles in press).
Ethnographic discipline-the skill and art of ethnographic practice-is practiced by
carefully observing and following, being guided by, recognizing, replicating. It is a
condition of readiness-readiness to be responsive. 8 It entails an abeyance of the
ethnographer's agency as much as a projection of that agency (Miyazaki 2004).
But what is important in the context of the anthropology of human rights in particular is that this self-discipline is the very opposite of the routinized instrumentalism
of human rights administrations or the "due diligence" practices of international
institutions that on the surface are all about attention and care (Maurer 2005): If the
ethnographer willingly serves as a kind of tool, she is a tool for the "echolocation"
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of knowledge (Wagner 2000), for allowing others to practice their knowledge on
and through her. In other words, the appropriate form of dispensing humanism
in these harrowing situations is something that must be forever freshly learned and
appreciated intersubjectively, in collaborative engagement with our subjects (see
also FinnstriSm 2000). In these respects, self-instrumentalization can be a practice
of self-discipline (Mahmood 2001; Hirschkind 2001). Perhaps the crux of "discipline"
is ongoing labor: a commitment to ongoing responsiveness, and a parallel aversion
to the routinization of our own forms of engagement.
Many anthropological critics of human rights administrations have quite rightly
complained that legal and bureaucratic practices instrumentalize victims' testimonies, turn these into tools for their own purposes (e.g., Wilson 2003:268). They
might add that these practices instrumentalize anthropological knowledge as well
(Riles in press). We think that disciplined practice ironically offers a response to
this problem from within the form of the instrument itself: When anthropologists
self-consciously make themselves available as a "tool" for echolocation, they take
charge of this instrumentalization. That is, the "end" the tool serves is now owned
by them, even though, by definition, and in contrast to the given ends of human
rights administrations such as vocalizing victims' testimonies, this anthropological end cannot yet be entirely known.
For example, in her article for this issue, Sally Merry (see also 2003) suggests that
on the terrain of human rights, anthropologists find themselves in dialogue and in
conflict with legal scholars and activists. Merry argues that anthropologists
increasingly find their concepts and analytical tools-culture, for exampleusurped or at least anticipated by human rights actors. Others have similarly
lamented the fact that "other" human rights actors tend to (mis)use anthropological
concepts (for example, Cowan et al. 2001).
To date, observations that "they are using our concepts" or using "our methods,"
have most commonly prompted calls for anthropologists to reclaim their
concepts' definitions and uses from other actors who are misusing them (see
Dembour 1996; Cowan et al. 2001; and also Mamdani 2002). But in her
contribution to this symposium, Merry treats the insight that others are using our
tools as an ethnographic finding-an outcome of her ethnographic observation of
lawyers and activists. This includes observation of the performance and application
of anthropology's tools in human rights contexts. Merry shows that the
anthropologist figures as just another tool these professions or projects might
want to engage (see also Rosga, this issue.) We think that the ethnographic posture
displayed by Merry and Rosga, as they resist both overidentification with and
resentment of anthropology's newfound colleagues, and remain instead cirious
about a field to which most would want to add themselves on (or act as an alternative to), marks a significant replenishment of our own disciplinary capacities.
This need not rule out activism, or relevance defined in terms of other standards
and other kinds of projects (see Scheper-Hughes 1992). Scheper-Hughes (1995)
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and others (Fields 2003; Gledhill 2002; Rabinow 2002) have argued that anthropologists should attend separately to activism and to ethnography, 9 treating them
as distinct enterprises that are perhaps equally important but are nevertheless not
commensurate. For example, most scholars who responded publicly to the events
in the Middle East of the past four years did so in venues or genres separate and
different from their own ethnographic work.
But often, forms of direct involvement with human rights nevertheless spill over
into scholarly projects: Anthropologists now often adopt the categories and analytical frames of lawyers, bureaucrats, and loosely organized circuits of activists
(McLagan, this volume) as given analytical frames for scholarly anthropological
work itself. 10 The numerous resolutions of the American Anthropological
Association, and the procedures for producing them (see Engle 2001; Price 2002),
for example, seem to emulate practices anthropologists have observed at the
United Nations or in other human rights bureaucratic contexts (Mueblenbach
2001). What concerns us is that often the performance of these forms of expertise
comes to substitute for scholarly work. We want to resist the conflation of different commitments and knowledge forms. And we want to query the way attending
to some commitments such as activism infinitely defers attention from questions
and debates within our own discipline-defers care for our own disciplinary
needs.
Our larger point, then, is that if at times it seems that there is no difference between
anthropological practice and human rights practice, then perhaps difference, like
relevance, must be produced, as an effect, not simply found in the world.
Ironically, one way to make a difference between anthropological work and human
rights work is to pause when others ask one to join, to exercise discipline when one
is incorporated into this network or that document-producing project, to take time
to instrumentalize oneself in analogous but also entirely different ways. That is,
this disciplined self-instrumentalization aims to serve as an analogue, an empathetic response in another register, not simply an extension of the subject. We want
to suggest that it can also serve as a response to the instrumentalization of anthropology as a weapon of human rights activism and administrations.
Most of the articles in this issue reinterpret the dominant modalities of human
rights anthropology we have described by exercising the kind of discipline we are
advocating. Against the tradition of giving voice to victims, of speaking their
narratives, or seeking ways to draw out the pain of torture, for example, Wendy
Coxshall finds ways of holding back. In Coxshall's account, one sees clearly how
giving voice to those who narrate also ignores those who choose to hold backhow giving voice recognizes agency only when others are willing to speak.
Coxshall resists two obvious moves that characterize two phases in anthropological engagement with victims and silence, before and after the advent of TRCs:
She might have insisted on drawing her subjects out and thereby proving anthropology's superior skills in doing so. Or conversely, she might have critiqued the
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TRC for making victims speak. Instead the "unwillingness" of one subject to participate in efforts to narrativize and speak her violations is left standing to pose a
question to us: why not speak? Could the subject have her own reasons, a genuine
disinterest that we do not understand but could come to appreciate? Is silencing
of the self perhaps an act, intentional, purposeful, instead of a "loss,"
incapacitation, or a form of imposition?
Likewise, Rosga engages the tradition of co-construction by tracing in a highly focused way the difference between her own contextualizing work and that of her
subjects/collaborators who expect co-construction (the joint production of a social
scientific report). It would have been easy for Rosga to critique the practices of
the NGOs she worked with or even to describe them ironically and humorously.
This would have produced a comfortable satisfaction in the anthropological reader.
But Rosga rejects this easy position, on both ethical and creative grounds. Instead,
she works with the form of her argument to find a disciplined way of expressing
the multiple turns of instrumentalization and reinstrumentalization that she
encountered in the field. She cannot use context as an organizing aesthetic, for
example, because contextualization is precisely the object she is observing. She
therefore takes the artifact-the human rights report she has been asked to draft
itself-as the organizing practice. Rosga's article exemplifies how one might see
the work of ethnography as finding and accepting a limit to one's own analytical
practice as both a means and an end of engagement with the subject, what
Miyazaki terms a "problem and solution seen at once" (Miyazaki 2004).
One of the specific places of our collective intervention concerns the character of
contextual analysis. The articles eschew any notion that there can be a formula for
what counts as appropriate context-a certain dose of subjective experience of
human rights participants combined with some analysis of the structural underpinnings of those experiences and infused with vignettes that show actors exercising agency in tension with the structures that define their experience, for
example. Instead, the articles suggest how the project of contextualizing human
rights discourses and practices might be rethought by asking, what constitutes
context, and what different purposes does it serve, for the subject and for the
anthropologist, in each anthropological engagement with different human rights
subjects? Rather than treating contextualization as a mechanical move, something
to be added to the material, and rather than doggedly applying a certain methodology drawn from outside the material to the "facts" (as in the old notion of
methodological "rigor"), the authors in this issue instead carefully learn for themselves in each case what is relevant and why. Here lies the difference between
being formulaic or iterative or rigorous and being disciplined.
Conclusion
Almost two decades ago, in the context of anthropologists' engagement with
feminism, Strathem (1987) argued against surrendering anthropology's own ground
as we engage with other disciplines and ethical projects. She observed that while
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anthropology continually needs different partners to remain in a perpetual state of
self-reform, feminists also need different disciplines and fields in which to plant
their critique. Ironically, for anthropology to be of any "use" to feminism, it had
to maintain its distance, its difference. The same point can be made today, we
think, of the engagement of anthropology and human rights.
Take for example the question of dignity. One recurring concern in debates in
the anthropology of human rights has been the question of how to give people
dignity, and how to promote dignity through anthropological work. Related to this
are a series of questions about anthropological ethics: what does it mean to act
ethically in the field, and what are the ethical rules governing ethnographic writing?
We are concerned about the arguably patronizing and missionary dimensions of
this project of giving others dignity and about the self-stabilizing dimensions
of techniques for ensuring oneself that one has behaved ethically. We want to suggest rather that emulating our ethnographic subjects' attention, care, or discipline
for particular relations, issues, and practices in our own account, replicating that
discipline, attention, or care on our own terrain (Miyazaki 2004), is one way
anthropologists can engage our political and moral obligations to our subjects
and ourselves. Discipline in description that in turn reveals the care in others'
practices is, in other words, a kind of ethics. It is in a real sense the ethnographic
analog of promoting human rights.
Of course, this kind of engagement demands taking a risk: One must be willing
to produce a description that is profoundly unsettling from the standpoint of the
ethical, epistemological, and aesthetic rules of human rights work and
anthropological analysis. But it is precisely this risk that recognizes our subject
as just as human as ourselves. Responsive, risk-taking ethnography and analysis
is a form of ethnographic activism, in other words, even though its instrumental
uses are not so openly asserted or prefigured at the outset.
What the articles in this special issue demonstrate is that relevance to the world
comes if anthropologists manage in a disciplined manner to make the world truly
relevant to themselves, to their own objectives. What we hope to show is that
exercising care toward subjects such as violence and rights by no means entails
ceasing to care for anthropology as a discipline or exercising discipline in
ethnographic practice. On the contrary.
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1. Anthropological encounters with modem political conflicts in the 1950s had
come to pass more by default than by design, but they nonetheless had the
result of adding impetus to reconceptions of society as "process" as opposed
to "structure," as exemplified by Gluckman's (1955) "custom-and-conflict"
approach. Up until the reflexive turn of the 1980s, however, anthropology
settled for a combination of structure and process (cf. Sluka 1992; Lbfving
and Macek 2000). Political violence was perceived as limited, bounded, or
balanced by other moments of stasis. However, these developments prepared
the ground for what came next: the instatement of conflict and of violence as
immanent, present in all political life (one need only think of the enthusiasm
with which anthropologists have embraced the Foucauldian truism that power
is everywhere), and eventually, in all sectors of everyday life as well (Das
2003).
2.

Nordstrom critiques political science forms of recounting war stories on
grounds that these fail to take account of the presence of social activity in
such situations (e.g., Nordstrom and Robben 1995; Nordstrom 2000;
Ldfving and Macek 2000). This is not our aim.

3.

In mid-century feminist research, female anatomy was thought to be required
to access privileged knowledge about being female because such knowledge
was thought to be fixed within the body. Strathern argued that a premise in
the anthropology of experience is the conceptualization of the person as
individual, as a being that worries-first and foremost-about its boundaries
and searches for a unitary (and settled, secure) identity (Strathern 1988:
56-57).

4.

Tsing (2000) offers a compelling comparison with respect to former social
scientific affiliations with "modernization," "development," and most recently,
"globalization" projects. In these areas, too, anthropologists have moved
away from earlier support of such projects and now position themselves
rather as external critics. Cunningham (1999) makes the same observation
about globalization, as does Spencer (1990) with respect to anthropological
collusion with nation-building projects.

5.

One can see this pattern in the recent turn toward a decidedly critical stance
not only toward TRCs and NGOs, but also toward laws granting special
status to indigenous peoples (Povinelli 2002), and even toward well-established
indigenous movements (Hodgson 1999, 2002a, b).

6. Richard Wilson, for example, has argued that the power of "human rights"
for anthropology resides in the fact that we are dealing with "one of the most

HeinOnline -- 28 PoLAR 191 2005

Pa~e 192

POLAR: Vol. 28. No. 2

globalized political values of our time" (Wilson 1997a: 1; see also Wilson
2003a; cf. Cowan et al. 2001, Dembour 1996, Hastrup 2001a and 2001c;
Jackson 2002). Indeed, the "global" or "transnational" character of human
rights features in many recent studies as both the starting position and also
the ultimate research finding.
7. Jean-Klein (N.d. [b]) has argued that even journalistic accounts of Palestinian
martyrdom during the Second Intifada have been a richer source of ethnographic information than social science accounts, which are too concerned
to either condemn or defend (or at least to render explainable) the martyrs'
actions, which they do from positions that exclude the knowledge of the
martyrs themselves and their close relations. One exception that we would
like to single out is the work of Hasso (N.d.).
8. We are not concerned with whether interviews are adequate substitutes
for long-term participant-observation, or whether "fieldwork" and "participantobservation" are practicable, or morally desirable, in open conflict situations, a question that has been a focus of continuous internal discussion in
this field (see Nordstrom 2003, Nordstrom and Robben 1995, Hoffman
2003, Keppley-Mahmood 2002, 2003; Starn 1991; Scheper-Hughes 1995;
Wakin 1993; Wax 2002). We do not equate "participant-observation" or
"fieldwork" with knowledge, nor would we want to presume that anthropological insight unfolds automatically with "the work of time" (Das
2000).
9. For a counterview, see Das (2003). Ortner (2000), in an excellent review of
three edited volumes about the future of anthropology in the light of concerns
about its relevance to the world, argues that such debates have become
locked into two voices: positivism versus activism (Ahmed and Shore 1995;
Hubinger 1996; Moore 1996).
10. For an earlier example showing the infusion of scholarly analysis with
analytical frames used by the subject, Palestinian political organizations, see
Hiltermann (1991).
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